

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0529

FOR AF/E; AMBASSADOR JOHN L. LOUGHRAN ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, SO
SUBJ: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REFS: A) CERP 0001; B) STATE 050086; C) STATE 047671; D) STATE
038338; E) STATE 038356; F) MOGADISCIO 0439 12/2/76

1. FOLLOWING DRAFT POLICY ANALYSIS AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I
IS FOR ATTENTION AMBASSADOR JOHN L. LOUGHRAN. DRAFT SHOULD NOT BE
DISTRIBUTED TO ANYONE UNLESS AND UNTIL APPROVED BY AMBASSADOR.

2. FOR AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN: WHEN WRITING AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW,
SUGGEST YOU LOOK AT RECENT CABLE TRAFFIC ON SOVIET/ARAB DIPLOMATIC
COMPETITION IN SOMALIA. COMPETITION IS NO LONGER MATTER OF RUMOR
OR CONJECTURE BUT IS NOW DISCUSSED MORE OR LESS OPENLY EVEN BY
PRESIDENT SIAD. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, BELIEVE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE
IS ENTERING NEW PHASE IN WHICH USG HAS INTERESTING OPTIONS. IN OUR
OWN DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE ENCOUNTERING SOMEWHAT
MORE RECEPTIVITY TO ROUTINE US REQUESTS. AS RESULT, WE HAVE GIVEN
OUR PORTION OF PAPER MORE POSITIVE CAST THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN CASE,
SAY, FEW MONTHS AGO. ON PERSONAL NOTE, STAFF SENDS REGARDS AND
GET-WELL WISHES.

3. PART I. POLICY PROPOSALS

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A. U.S. INTERESTS

(1) LIMITING MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY
SOVIET UNION IN SOMALIA.

(2) ENCOURAGING PRESIDENT MOHAMED SIAD BARRE TO ADOPT MORE
INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY.

B. AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW

(TO BE ADDED)

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION, AND ISSUES

(1) OBJECTIVES

(A) TO PERSUADE GSDR THAT UNLIMITED SOVIET ACCESS TO NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES IN SOMALIA IS NOT IN GSDR'S LONG-TERM NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

(B) TO PERSUADE GSDR THAT MORE NEARLY NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN POLICY WILL ENHANCE ITS NATIONAL SECURITY AND REAP SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS.

(C) TO ALLAY GSDR SUSPICION OF AND HOSTILITY TO U.S.

(2) COURSES OF ACTION

(A) THROUGH THIRD PARTIES AND MEDIA, WE SHOULD FOCUS GSDR ATTENTION ON GROWING SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE OVER AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WITH ETHIOPIAN PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT (EPMG). IN PARTICULAR,

SOVIET ROLE IN ARMING SOMALI'S TRADITIONAL ENEMY AND THWARTING GSDR'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, AS WELL AS DANGERS OF DEEP PENETRATION OF SOMALIA ARMED FORCES BY AN UNCERTAIN ALLY, SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO GSDR'S ATTENTION. U.S., HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT RAISE SOVIET CONFIDENTIAL

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ROLE DIRECTLY WITH GSDR, WHICH IS VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT ANY OVERT INTERFERENCE IN ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

(B) WE SHOULD FRANKLY, BUT PRIVATELY, TELL GSDR THAT U.S. IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN USE MADE BY SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES OF SOMALI FACILITIES. BUT WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE MAKE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA FOR SOMALIA'S DEFENSE, TO WHICH WE MAKE NO OBJECTION, AND SOVIET RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. AND ENHANCE SOVIET WAR-MAKING CAPABILITIES.

(C) WE SHOULD RE-EXAMINE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. SHIP VISIT IF AND WHEN THERE IS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF IMPROVED U.S.-SOMALI RELATIONS.

(D) RECOGNIZING THAT U.S. AND MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES, PRINCIPALLY SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND EGYPT, HAVE PARALLEL INTERESTS IN SOMALIA, WE SHOULD TRY TO COORDINATE OUR POLICIES TOWARD GSDR THROUGH INFORMAL BUT

REGULAR CONSULTATIONS. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THESE COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON GSDR TO REORIENT ITS FOREIGN POLICY AND TO OFFER SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS TO DO SO; IDEALLY, LEVEL OF ARAB ASSISTANCE WOULD BE TIED TO EXTENT OF GSDR'S RETURN TO NON-ALIGNMENT. WE SHOULD SEEK WAYS OF COUPLING U.S. TECHNOLOGY WITH ARAB PETRO-DOLLARS IN SOMALI DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

(E) IN GENERAL, WE SHOULD ADOPT A LOW-KEY BUT POSITIVE POSTURE WITH RESPECT TO GSDR, EMPHASIZING VALUE OF A FRANK DIALOGUE, EVEN WHERE THERE IS DISAGREEMENT, AND ENCOURAGE GSDR TO EXPLORE WITH US AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST AND POSSIBLE BILATERAL COOPERATION. WE SHOULD INSIST ON PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY IN TREATMENT OF RESPECTIVE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS.

(F) PROVIDED THERE IS A COMMENSURATE POLITICAL QUID PRO QUO,
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WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR DIRECT SUPPORT FOR GSDR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES BY RESUMING MODEST BILATERAL AID PROGRAM IN SOMALIA. AT THIS STAGE AND FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE, WE DO NOT ENVISAGE AN AID MISSION AT MOGADISCIO, BUT WOULD EXPECT TO ADMINISTER ANY U.S. AID THROUGH AVAILABLE EMBASSY PERSONNEL. FOR MAXIMUM POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS, U.S. AID SHOULD BE IDENTIFIABLE AS SUCH AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBMERGED IN EXISTING UN PROGRAMS (ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NOT TERMINATE U.S. AID ALREADY REACHING GSDR VIA MULTILATERAL CHANNELS).

(G) WE SHOULD ACTIVELY SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO RAISE U.S.' INFORMATION, CULTURAL AND SPORTS PROFILE IN SOMALIA, NOW AT A LOW EBB. GSDR RECEPTIVITY TO U.S. OFFERS OF COOPERATION IN THESE AREAS, AND ITS OWN EFFORTS TO TONE DOWN ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA IN OFFICIAL MEDIA, ARE APPROPRIATE YARDSTICKS OF ABOVE-MENTIONED QUID PRO QUO AT THIS STAGE.

(H) AT SAME TIME, WE SHOULD TRY TO STREAMLINE OUR DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT AT MOGADISCIO, CONSOLIDATING FUNCTIONS AND FACILITIES AND ELIMINATING SURPLUS FBO INVENTORY, TO EXTENT POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD ABANDON ANY INTENTION OF COMPLETING AND OCCUPYING 150-ACRE EMBASSY COMPOUND ON AFGOI ROAD, A PERMANENT ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND POLITICAL LIABILITY, AND TRY TO INITIATE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF PROPERTIES WITH GSDR. STREAMLINING SHOULD PERMIT US TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS. A MORE FAR-REACHING LOOK AT U.S. STAFFING AND RESOURCES AT MOGADISCIO WOULD BE DESIRABLE BUT MUST BE RELATED TO CURRENT HIGH-LEVEL POLICY REVIEW ON HORN OF AFRICA.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4756

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0529

FOR AF/E; AMBASSADOR JOHN L. LOUGHRAN ONLY

(3) ISSUES

(A) SIAD'S SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. INTENTIONS ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN U.S./SOMALI RELATIONS. ON BOTH IDEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL GROUNDS, HE NURTURES CONVICTION THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN AND MAY STILL BE WORKING FOR OVERTHROW OF SOMALI "SOCIALISM" AND TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE OGADEN. THIS CONVICTION MAY HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED BY HIS COMMUNIST ADVISORS BUT DERIVES, IN FINAL ANALYSIS, FROM HIS OWN WORLD VIEW. EVEN NOW, WHEN SIAD IS ENGAGED IN AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF HIS ALLIANCES, STEMMING FROM SOVIETS' GROWING INVOLVEMENT WITH EPMG, IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO RETURN OPENLY TO U.S. IT WILL REQUIRE DISCREET AND PATIENT MISSIONARY WORK TO OVERCOME PAST, AS CONCEIVED BY SIAD, AND TO BRING AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO FORE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. BY SAME TOKEN, U.S. OVER-REACTION TO SIAD'S DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA COULD RAISE FALSE EXPECTATIONS AND/OR SCARE HIM OFF.

(B) SINCE SO MUCH OF SIAD'S APPRECIATION OF U.S. INTENTIONS IS PRODUCT OF PAST U.S. SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA, OUR RESPONSE TO PRESENT PRO-SOVIET TREND IN THAT COUNTRY COULD HAVE A MATERIAL EFFECT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH GSDR, EVEN IF NOT SO INTENDED. ANY DECISION TO REDUCE OR CUT OFF ALTOGETHER EPMG'S ACCESS TO U.S. AIMS WOULD FIGURE IN GSDR'S CALCULATIONS. CLOSURE OF
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KAGNEW STATION AND CONSULATE GENERAL AT ASMARA, AS WELL AS U.S. EFFORTS TO RESTRAIN ANY EPMG INCLINATION TO PREEMPT DJIBOUTI

SITUATION, WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT. IN OTHER WORDS, SIAD WILL WELCOME ANY U.S. MOVES TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM EPMG OR, AS HE WOULD SEE IT, TO HELP CLEAR WAY FOR FULFILLMENT OF LONG-TERM SOMALI TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. WE SHOULD NOT SHRINK FROM EXPLOITING ANY U.S. MOVES IN ETHIOPIA FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH IN TERMS OF SOMALI GOOD-WILL, BUT WITHIN FOLLOWING IMPORTANT LIMITATIONS. WE SHOULD BE DISCREET. AND WE SHOULD AVOID UNINTENTIONAL SIGNALS THAT U.S. HAS DOWNGRADED ITS TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES AND FOR PEACEFUL

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES.

(C) GIVEN GSDR'S SUSPICIONS OF U.S., AS WELL AS BUILT-IN INHIBITIONS ON OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN SOMALIA, I.E., MINIMAL U.S. AID POSSIBILITIES AND OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR EXISTING INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS, U.S. IS NOT IN POSITION, BY ITSELF, TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF GSDR'S CURRENT DISAFFECTION FROM SOVIETS. AS INDICATED IN (2) (D), HOWEVER, U.S. AND MODERATE ARAB INTERESTS RUN PARALLEL IN SOMALIA, AT LEAST OVER SHORT-TERM, AND ARABS ARE NOT INHIBITED BY SAME POLICY RESTRAINTS. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE ARABS TO TAKE LEAD IN EFFORTS TO WEAN GSDR AWAY FROM SOVIETS AND TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS TO KEEP GSDR, AT LEAST, NON-ALIGNED. WE SHOULD CONSULT REGULARLY WITH ARABS TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES HAVE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF SITUATION, ARE PURSUING MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE POLICIES AND, LAST BUT NOT LEAST, THAT SIAD HAS NO OPPORTUNITY TO USE ONE PARTY AGAINST ANOTHER FOR NEKIS OWN ENDS, A GAME AT WHICH HE IS A MASTER. THERE IS ANOTHER, LONGER-TERM, REASON TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ARABS ON POLICY IN HORN OF AFRICA. SOME ARAB STATES APPARENTLY SEE EXTRUSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE FROM SOMALIA AS ONE PHASE OF A PLAN TO TURN RED SEA INTO AN ARAB LAKE, IN WHICH ETHIOPIA IS TO BE DISMEMBERED, MUSLIM SUCCESSOR STATES ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED OR EXPANDED AND NON-ARAB INTERESTS SQUEEZED OUT OF AREA. WHILE U.S. WOULD WELCOME EXPULSION OF SOVIETS, WE COULD NOT BE ENTIRELY CONFIDENTIAL

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INDIFFERENT TO ARABS' HEGEMONISTIC AMBITIONS WITH RESPECT TO A STRATEGIC AREA AND WATERWAY, EVEN IF LATTER ARE CURRENTLY WELL-DISPOSED TO U.S.
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